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“The global climate change regime . . . . was once considered an elegant, ground-
breaking area of multinational environmental law [but] is now looking decidedly 
complex, increasingly weary, and, to some, unfit for its purpose.”
Turbulence in the Climate Regime
sTephen peake
Throughout the history of international cli-mate negotiations, the rhetoric of the “last chance” has never been far away. The 
world’s latest “last chance” was the December 
2009 Copenhagen summit. But now here comes 
another dramatic moment in the global climate 
change talks.
Between November 29 and December 10, 2010, 
Cancun will host the 16th Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 6th Meeting 
of the Parties to the convention’s Kyoto Protocol. 
With the days for bargaining before the talks now 
dwindling, nations are once again posturing and 
preparing to lock horns in what has become one 
of the most technically and politically compli-
cated global negotiations in history. 
If satisfaction is a function of expectations, then 
it is not hard to understand the overwhelming dis-
satisfaction that delegates and the world’s media 
experienced last December regarding the outcome 
at Copenhagen. Expectations had risen out of 
hand in the run-up to the meeting. Today, in con-
trast, the mood in the run-up to Cancun is sober. 
The hangover from Copenhagen has still not fully 
worn off among negotiators, and expectations are 
now more carefully managed. All parties speak of 
the difficulty of reaching a legally binding out-
come either in Cancun or indeed during the next 
major climate conference, scheduled to take place 
in South Africa at the end of 2011.
The Kyoto Protocol specifies binding targets for 
industrialized countries to reduce the greenhouse 
gas emissions that contribute to global warming. 
The Protocol was designed to oversee emissions 
declines over the long term in a set of consecu-
tive five-year plans. The first five-year plan ends 
in 2012. The next one should in theory begin in 
2013. But now even some negotiating documents 
anticipate potential “gaps” between the end of 
Kyoto’s initial commitments and the start of a 
legally binding timetable under a new agreement. 
It has been a turbulent couple of years for the 
international science-policy regime concerning cli-
mate change. With the start of Barack Obama’s pres-
idency in early 2009 and with the subsequent wave 
of “green” economic stimulus plans that countries 
around the world put forward in response to the 
2008 financial crisis, a sense of optimism emerged. 
But this mood was soon crushed by a triple wham-
my consisting of “Climategate”—a controversy in 
late 2009 that called into question the integrity 
of a group of climate researchers; the perceived 
failure of Copenhagen in December last year; and 
the retraction in early 2010 of some claims about 
potential climate impacts by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a UN-based scien-
tific advisory group.
Stresses are building in the political tectonics 
of the global climate change regime. What was 
once considered an elegant, groundbreaking area 
of multinational environmental law is now look-
ing decidedly complex, increasingly weary, and, 
to some, unfit for its purpose. Negotiations have 
stalled in a mammoth game of chicken-and-egg: 
What comes first—text or political agreement? 
Targets or actions?
Copenhagen was by no means an outright fail-
ure. But because expectations for a new legally 
binding global agreement had been built up, the 
general reaction to the talks has put a great deal 
of strain on the climate regime. Likewise, the fail-
ure of the United States to enact comprehensive 
climate legislation, combined with a change of 
government in Australia in part due to the unpop-
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ularity of a proposed emissions-trading scheme, 
has increased negotiators’ doubts and wariness.
building a frameWork
It has been about a quarter of a century since 
the international community started to take cli-
mate change seriously, and the steps that have 
been taken so far—while setting an impressive, if 
complex, foundation—have unfortunately coin-
cided with a significant rise in global greenhouse 
gas emissions.
The UNFCCC regime came into force in 1994, 
and at the first follow-up conference, in Berlin 
in 1995, negotiators began bargaining over the 
implementation of long-term targets and time-
tables for emissions reductions by developed 
countries. The “F” in UNFCCC is important—it 
is a “framework” treaty. This means that various 
key details of how its goals should be achieved 
required further elaboration from the beginning. 
In the original agreement, developed countries 
pledged to return their greenhouse gas emissions 
to 1990 levels. But in order 
to do so, it was argued, a 
longer time frame would 
be needed—one that would 
allow planned and natu-
ral economic adjustments 
to deliver emissions reduc-
tions at economic costs that 
were much lower (perhaps 
even negative in some cases).
The result was the “Berlin Mandate,” which 
attempted to address many of these implementa-
tion concerns. Finally, on December 11, 1997, the 
text of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted. A further 
seven years of negotiation and political maneuver-
ing ended when Russia ratified the Protocol in late 
2004, allowing it to come into force on February 
16, 2005. The Americans and Australians refused 
to ratify the treaty—but nevertheless, here we had a 
legally binding regime for emissions controls. And 
we had a nascent carbon market involving some 
innovative flexibility mechanisms, such as trading 
in emissions credits, to help developed nations 
achieve their carbon emission reductions (and 
in theory to promote sustainable development in 
Eastern Europe and the developing world).
Like the UNFCCC itself, the text of the Kyoto 
Protocol was a political agreement—the specific 
modalities of its operation would be hashed out 
and eventually finalized in 2001 in Marrakesh. 
Kyoto was designed so that the caps on industrial-
ized countries’ emissions would be lowered every 
five years, or “commitment periods,” as they are 
called. Kyoto’s first five-year commitment period 
ends in 2012. A global economic downturn has 
helped reduce emissions recently, but even so, sev-
eral developed countries are on track to overshoot 
their Kyoto commitments—some spectacularly 
so (for example, Canada). Thus the negotiations 
leading up to Copenhagen concerned a successor 
to the Kyoto Protocol and a strengthening of com-
mitments in general under the UNFCCC.
Copenhagen was unique in its staging as both a 
climate conference and a summit of world leaders. 
For the humdrum business of the annual climate 
conferences, the diplomatic protocol is that heads 
of state or their representatives fly in for the “high-
level segment” at the start of the second week, 
give their speeches, and then fly off again more 
or less right away, leaving their heads of delega-
tion to horse-trade and negotiate the minutiae of 
the final political agreements. A few keen heads of 
state might stay on. But Copenhagen was different. 
The leaders flew in and they 
stayed—partly in response 
to the new, positive energy 
around Obama and the hope 
that this energy could lead 
to a breakthrough in nego-
tiations.
The Danish hosts had 
scheduled plenary sessions 
with heads of state sitting, rather unusually, in a 
theater-style lecture rather than around the usual 
grand summit table. The leaders each took the 
floor, egging one another on at times like naughty 
school kids, and behaved, rather predictably, in an 
unscripted fashion. Climate conferences and sum-
mits, it turns out, do not mix. As the negotiations 
quickly turned to back-room summitry, the climate 
treaty process seemed sidelined, even undermined, 
with many delegates and the press unsure as to what 
was happening in the final days and hours. The final 
accord emerged from a smaller negotiation involv-
ing around 30 countries, in turn driven by a much 
smaller core of the most powerful nations, including 
China, India, and the United States.
the copenhagen deal
The global media’s subsequent framing of 
Copenhagen’s outcome was almost universally 
negative. But in fact, several elements of the 
Copenhagen Accord indicate real diplomatic prog-
ress. Granted, the Accord’s status within interna-
Four scientific assessment reports  
and sixteen climate change summits  
later, global greenhouse emissions  
have risen by about a third.
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tional law is unquestionably soft. It is far from the 
legally binding successor to Kyoto that many were 
hoping for. Nevertheless, it is a letter of intent 
signed by 140 parties representing approximately 
80 percent of global emissions (compared to 30 
percent in the case of Kyoto).
Thanks to the achievements in Copenhagen 
we have, as we approach Cancun: (1) a helpful 
quantitative clarification of the UNFCCC, asserting 
that in order to prevent “dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system,” the 
increase in global temperature “should be below 
2oC” (albeit we are not sure of the base year); 
(2) an agreement to “cooperate in achieving the 
peaking of global and national emissions as soon 
as possible”—this phrase is distinctly new; (3) 
a set of longer-term [2020] emissions targets for 
developed countries; (4) an invitation to devel-
oping countries to submit inventories of mitiga-
tion actions; and (5) a commitment to provide 
technology and additional financial assistance for 
developing countries to help reduce emissions 
and mitigate the effects of climate change. The 
financial aid is to amount to $30 billion annually 
by 2012, with a commitment to raise that figure to 
$100 billion per year by 2020.
In recent years, several back-of-the-envelope 
modeling exercises have indicated that the amount 
of money developing countries need in order to 
adapt to the impact of climate change in coming 
years is in the region of $100 billion to $200 bil-
lion per year. Taken at face value, the commitment 
to provide additional finance (that is, over and 
above current aid expenditures) of $100 billion 
per year by 2020 is very significant. Copenhagen’s 
$100 billion fund represents the single greatest 
commitment of development assistance in history 
and comes on top of an aid budget that is already 
increasing rapidly.
To put this in perspective, gross overseas devel-
opment assistance provided in 2008 by members 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) was about $120 bil-
lion, some $35 billion of which was multilateral 
aid. This is approximately 0.3 percent of 2008 
global gross national income (GNI). The figure 
has been rising rapidly in recent years as more 
and more developed countries have responded 
to their commitment, under the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goal program, to raise aid to 0.7 
percent of GNI (about $250 billion) by 2015.
If OECD donor countries were to fulfill both 
their Millennium Development Goals and the 
Copenhagen commitment, global overseas devel-
opment assistance would reach $350 billion by 
2020—a near tripling of current levels. These are 
unprecedented sums. (Indeed, they instantly pose 
questions about the capacity of the development 
assistance community as well as host countries to 
usefully absorb such additional spending.)
If the numbers are staggering in relation to 
development assistance, they are even more so in 
terms of specific funding for climate change. Total 
resources dedicated to climate change mitigation 
and adaptation are currently in the range of $9 
billion to $10 billion per year ($8–9 billion for 
mitigation and $1 billion for adaptation). OECD 
data show that members of the organization’s 
Development Assistance Committee provided 
$3.8 billion in bilateral assistance in 2007 to help 
developing countries reduce their own green-
house emissions. This represents about 4 percent 
of total bilateral development aid that year. The 
largest donors were Japan ($1.3 billion), Germany 
($800 million), and France ($500 million). This 
funding contributes to sustainable development 
and greenhouse gas reduction in developing coun-
tries’ energy, transport, water, and forestry sectors.
So the Copenhagen deal not only helps tre-
ble overall development assistance; it effective-
ly increases climate-related development aid by 
1,000 percent in less than a decade—assuming, of 
course, the commitments are respected.
the ticking clock
Going forward, one of the greatest stumbling 
blocks in the climate negotiations is the practical 
interpretation of the “principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities.” According to the 
UNFCCC, parties should act to protect the climate 
system “on the basis of equality and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities.” The “common” 
element of the principle is over 60 years old (for 
example, the international community has been dis-
cussing common concerns about stocks of tuna and 
other fish since 1949). The phrase “differentiated 
responsibility” (or expressions that are derivatives 
thereof) crept into international law in the 1970s, 
implicitly recognizing that developing countries’ 
first priorities are economic and social development.
Recent scientific findings embodied in the 
spirit of the Copenhagen Accord suggest that the 
earlier the “peaking” of global carbon emissions, 
the better. Meanwhile, today’s situation can be 
likened to parties sitting locked in a room with 
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a ticking time bomb, squabbling over who is to 
blame for the predicament.
The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities has the effect of delaying the peak-
ing of emissions, as developing countries invoke 
their right to develop on the basis of cheap, carbon-
based energy supplies just as their richer counter-
parts did. Developing countries point the finger at 
the OECD economies and ask them to show leader-
ship and provide financial assistance. Developed 
countries point back at the ticking clock.
Interestingly, the Copenhagen Accord provides 
an implicit time stamp identifying where differen-
tiation of responsibilities stands in practice. The 
Accord’s requirement for developing countries to 
list their actions in support of the UNFCCC marks 
precisely where developed countries stood back 
in 1994. On this basis, the developing world is 
running about 15 years behind in terms of com-
mitments under the climate regime. The upshot is 
that the principle of differentiated responsibilities 
has resulted in very slow political progress. 
ScientiStS aS playerS
Another key principle in the UNFCCC regime 
is that policy should be based on sound scientific 
advice. While hapless technocrats battle away in 
political and technical negotiations, a parallel set 
of battles has been taking place within the world’s 
scientific communities, as vividly reported by 
the global media. The IPCC was established in 
1988 and published its First Assessment Report 
in 1990. Scientific input from the IPCC was 
extremely influential in the design of the UNFCCC 
as agreed upon at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. 
Since then, the IPCC has published three more 
assessment reports outlining the evolving state of 
collective scientific knowledge regarding observed 
and predicted climate change.
The mantra has been that international climate 
policy making is based on sound science—with 
the IPCC providing “policy-relevant but not pre-
scriptive” summaries of the scientific evidence on 
climate change. Each time the IPCC has issued an 
assessment, its confidence that the earth is indeed 
warming at an alarming rate—and that humans 
are almost certainly the cause—has grown. The 
IPCC has shown clearly that humans have changed 
atmospheric composition by burning fossil fuels, 
producing cement, and clearing the land, and 
that the earth’s biogeochemical systems have been 
responding (through rising greenhouse gas con-
centrations, acidifying oceans, melting glaciers, 
increased drought, and changes in the timing of 
spring and in the ranges of species). All of this 
points to a rapid warming that far exceeds normal 
rates of climatic variability.
But the scientific foundation of the policy pro-
cess, in the form of the IPCC, has taken a batter-
ing recently through two turns of events. In late 
2009, the so-called Climategate affair embroiled 
the University of East Anglia’s Climatic Research 
Unit in a global debate about the integrity of a few 
scientists behind some cherished IPCC evidence 
of global warming. The other debacle came in 
the spring of 2010 when the IPCC had to retract 
an unsupported statement from 2007 suggesting 
there was evidence that the Himalayan glaciers 
would melt by 2035. 
Resistance is a function of speed. Both the 
above events, in different ways, contributed to 
a form of resistance among politicians, opinion 
formers, and ultimately voters that was itself a 
response to the speed at which the international 
climate policy regime was nudging toward a suc-
cessor to Kyoto in the buildup to Copenhagen.
The perceived stalling of the UNFCCC/Kyoto 
regime, combined with the reputational damage 
suffered by the IPCC, has prompted some assess-
ment of the international community’s overall 
progress in addressing climate change. Nearly a 
quarter of a century after the establishment of the 
IPCC, four scientific assessment reports and six-
teen climate change summits later, global green-
house emissions have risen by about a third.
At the same time, the latest science suggests 
these emissions must fall rapidly toward just 
20 percent of their current levels within a few 
decades if the world is to avoid global warming 
beyond 2oC. While it may be true that, with-
out the UNFCCC/Kyoto regime, global emissions 
might have been some 5 to 10 percent higher 
than they currently are (thanks to both Kyoto 
mechanisms and the setting of domestic targets), 
carbon emissions are still heading dramatically in 
the wrong direction.
deSign flaWS
Some are now openly critical of the overall cli-
mate regime’s progress to date. A group of experts 
held a post mortem meeting on Copenhagen 
in February 2010. The product of the meeting, 
known as the Hartwell Paper, argues that the 
UNFCCC regime has failed to reduce global green-
house gas emissions because it is structurally 
flawed. Indeed, according to the 14 authors of 
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the paper, the regime’s failure in 2009 “presents 
an immense opportunity to set climate policy free 
to fly at last.”’ Copenhagen, they argue, calls into 
question “the very process of multilateral diplo-
macy through large set-piece conferences.” They 
go on: “Copenhagen has shown us the limits of 
what can be achieved on climate change through 
centralizing and hyperbolic multilateralism.”
The authors have an interesting point to make 
about the overall design process of the climate 
regime. An enormous amount of complexity 
around principles, modalities, and operational 
entities has crept into the science-policy regime. 
Meanwhile, global emissions continue to rise and 
many in the world lack access to clean energy 
supplies. The Kyoto model “has dangerously nar-
rowed our option space for thinking seriously and 
realistically about energy and environmental poli-
cies,” the Hartwell experts claim.
Their diagnosis of design flaws is strong, as are 
their ideas for creative ways forward. They argue 
that decarbonization should be viewed as a con-
tingent benefit—not a prima-
ry goal in itself. A reframing 
of action on climate change 
to emphasize enabling access 
to clean energy has a much 
greater chance of success, 
they maintain. The world 
would be more successful in 
addressing climate change if 
the goal were changed from reduced “sinfulness” 
to increased “dignity”—that is, from a negative to 
a positive. 
One of the highest insights that anyone engaged 
in thinking about climate change can have is the 
revelation that “climate change” itself—as a term, 
a concept, or even a political movement—means 
everything and nothing. Typically, the ascent 
to this understanding involves the scaling of a 
number of false summits along the way. First the 
prescriptions for dealing with climate change are 
seen as similar to those around energy security 
(energy conservation, efficiency, and fuel diver-
sity). Then the agenda broadens to encompass a 
menu of policy prescriptions around mitigation 
for a basket of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, 
methane, nitrous oxide) across all sectors of the 
economy (buildings, transport, energy industry, 
agriculture, and so forth).
The next stage is the realization that mitigation 
is just half the problem—and that adapting to the 
now nearly inevitable effects of climate change is 
a critical piece of the negotiations jigsaw. In turn, 
this emphasis on adaptation promotes thinking 
about human development in a wider sense. The 
issue of climate change starts to be framed in the 
context of mechanisms to promote sustainable 
development—that is, in the context of globaliza-
tion and trade. Ultimately then, the problem of 
climate change is transformed from a simplistic 
understanding of an energy policy into a bundled 
set of agendas around development, globalization, 
trade, and models of economic growth.
This insight brings with it a powerful and trou-
blesome conundrum. Climate change and human 
development are inextricably linked and them-
selves interact with myriad social, economic, and 
biogeochemical systems. The problem, in other 
words, is complex. A natural, if somewhat poten-
tially misguided, response to the task of managing 
complexity is to call for greater centralization in 
the system of 300 or so multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) that now exist in the hope that 
this might lead to more effective policy making 
and sustainability outcomes.
The principle of com-
mon but differentiated 
responsibilities, along with 
some other influential legal 
notions associated with the 
Rio Earth Summit, is a com-
mon thread running through 
many MEAs—a kind of legal 
DNA. On top of this, the systemic nature of 
the challenge—the interdependence, inter-system 
complexity of the sustainability challenge—also 
suggests a more holistic approach. These argu-
ments in the past have led to calls for the estab-
lishment of a World Environment Organization 
or Forum—an environmental counterpart to the 
World Trade Organization. 
See you back in rio
It is likely that in the future the international 
community will look more toward the develop-
ment agenda to help advance climate change goals. 
The next Earth Summit will take place in 2012 in 
Rio de Janeiro. The planned summit, known as 
“Rio+20,” will be held 20 years after the 1992 
Earth Summit, which convened in the same city, 
and 40 years after the very first Conference on the 
Human Environment, which met in Stockholm in 
1972. Low expectations for a breakthrough on cli-
mate change in Cancun this year or even in South 
Africa in 2011 suggest that everything could come 
Continued stalemate in the  
UN-based system could lead  
“coalitions of the willing” to take  
the lead on climate action.
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to a head again at or around Rio+20. The themes 
of that summit will focus on “a green economy in 
the context of sustainable development and pov-
erty eradication and the institutional framework 
for sustainable development.”
What is likely to happen in the meantime? 
While parties to the UNFCCC are making few tan-
gible advances in negotiations (focusing instead 
on “bracketing” practically everything in sight), 
one bright light and potential area of breakthrough 
is a growing emphasis on what the negotiators 
call “cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-
specific actions.” These refer to concrete interna-
tional initiatives to improve, for example, energy 
efficiency in the transport or steel making sectors.
Kyoto’s preference for flexible mechanisms 
is still at work here, but in this framework the 
emphasis is not on carbon markets but on inter-
national technological cooperation—for example, 
to double the fuel efficiency of the world’s car 
fleet, or to develop new energy technologies or 
drought-resistant crops. Thus it is possible that a 
second version of the UNFCCC/Kyoto regime will 
transform itself into a more direct mechanism for 
the promotion of low-carbon technologies.
The last Earth Summit was Rio+10, held in 
Johannesburg in 2002. The Johannesburg plan of 
action, along with the Millennium Development 
Goals initiative, split up large challenges into 
smaller, more manageable parts (in the case of 
Johannesburg’s approach to sustainability, the 
parts were water, energy, health, agriculture, and 
biodiversity). This strategy of unraveling policy 
synergies is perhaps more politically attractive 
than attempting to deal with abstract notions 
of sustainable development. The authors of the 
Hartwell Paper argue similarly that “Adaptation, 
forests, biodiversity, air quality, equity, and the 
many other disparate agendas that have been 
attached to the climate issue must again stand on 
their own.”
Another possibility is that continued stale-
mate in the UN-based regime could lead to an 
increasing emphasis on non-UN “coalitions of 
the willing” to take the lead on climate action—
independent of the shackles of differentiated 
responsibilities and other UNFCCC/Kyoto prin-
ciples. We might see, for instance, the formation 
of an E-8 (the world’s top 8 emitters).
the StageS of failure
What makes this a spectacularly fascinating 
moment in history is science’s clear implication 
that we must wean the global economic system 
from cheap fossil fuels and unsustainable land 
use patterns in a very short period of time. 
Failure to do so may have, we are told, profound 
effects—including on the global economic sys-
tem itself.
Jared Diamond, in work based on his best-
selling 2005 book, Collapse: How Societies Choose 
to Fail or Succeed, offers a framework for think-
ing about how past societies have been capable 
of such dramatic failures in collective decision 
making that they have collapsed altogether. 
According to Diamond, four stages of failure in 
group decision making can lead to catastrophe: 
(1) a society fails to anticipate a problem before 
it arrives; (2) it fails to perceive the problem 
when it arrives; (3) it fails to try to solve the 
problem after perceiving it; and (4) it fails to 
solve the problem after trying.
Where are we in relation to the threat of climate 
change? While the infrared trapping capabilities 
of water vapor, carbon dioxide, and other green-
house gases have been known since the early 
nineteenth century, it was not until 1988 that the 
IPCC was established—about a century after John 
Tyndall suggested that slight changes in atmo-
spheric composition could bring about climatic 
changes. It took us about a century, thus, to avoid 
failure at Stage 1. The past 22 years of assessments 
by the IPCC have clearly set out the nature of the 
problem that climate change poses.
Many people have assimilated this knowledge 
to the extent that they have perceived something 
of the true nature of the threats (as well as a few 
opportunities) that the world faces as a result of 
rapid climate change. So the world, or at least 
much of it, has passed Stage 2. And it is clear 
that the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, however 
inadequate some may perceive them to be, are 
most definitely the start of some kind of global 
response (Stage 3).
The world’s leaders have perceived the prob-
lem that climate change presents—though this 
took a decade or two longer than would have 
been ideal (and indeed a few leaders remain 
unconvinced). Arguably, therefore, we have so 
far managed to avoid climate change–induced 
societal collapse through stages 1, 2, and 3. The 
world’s task at this point is to harness imagina-
tion and boldness to ensure political momentum 
for more effective measures—that is, we must 
try even harder to find workable international 
solutions. ■
